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I Introduction 
This paper considers whether the fiscal nullity doctrine, as it has 
become known, is part of the law of New Zealand governing the 
interpretation of tax legislation. 
The House of Lords first articulated the fiscal nullity 5 
doctrine in W T Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioners.
1
 Part 
II of this paper provides a description of that decision and 
background information on the doctrine such as the 
development of fiscal nullity and the reception of fiscal nullity 
in jurisdictions outside the United Kingdom including New 10 
Zealand. 
Sections II.B and II.C will explain that in jurisdictions 
outside the United Kingdom there is support for the view that 
the fiscal nullity doctrine operates as a judge-made general anti-
avoidance rule, that fiscal nullity reflects the particular legal 15 
context in the United Kingdom at the time that the House of 
Lords decided Ramsay and that fiscal nullity is not applicable in 
jurisdictions where the tax legislation includes a statutory 
general anti-avoidance provision.
2
 
In New Zealand the most significant decision relating to the 20 
fiscal nullity doctrine is Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue.
3
 In that case the Supreme 
Court, by a majority (Tipping, McGrath and Gault JJ), took an 
approach that is inconsistent with treating fiscal nullity as being 
part of New Zealand law. Given the significance of this decision 25 
to any discussion of fiscal nullity in New Zealand, part III of this 
paper analyses the reasoning of the majority with a view to 
demonstrating how the court could have taken a fiscal nullity 
approach in that case. 
Parts IV and V will then consider other possible grounds for 30 
arguing that the fiscal nullity doctrine is not part of New 
Zealand law. These grounds are that fiscal nullity is not 
compatible with the existence of a general anti-avoidance 
provision in New Zealand's income tax legislation, that fiscal 
                                                
1
 W T Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] AC 300 (HL). 
2 In this paper a reference to a statutory general anti-avoidance provision 
means a general anti-avoidance rule similar to section BG 1 of the Income 
Tax Act 2007 that is included in the relevant taxing statute. 
3
 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] 
NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289. 
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nullity is not reconcilable with the Duke of Westminster
4
 
principle and that fiscal nullity produces too much uncertainty in 
the application of tax legislation. This paper will argue that the 
better view is that fiscal nullity is part of New Zealand law 
because fiscal nullity is merely an application to tax legislation 5 
of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
II The Fiscal Nullity Doctrine 
A The Ramsay Case: The Inception of the Fiscal Nullity 
Doctrine 
Ramsay concerned transactions entered into by a taxpayer in an 10 
attempt to avoid capital gains tax on a gain from an earlier 
transaction by generating a loss on a disposal that could be 
offset against the gain. The taxpayer had embarked upon a series 
of transactions in order to produce both the requisite loss and a 
corresponding gain. It was intended that the nature of the 15 
corresponding gain was such that, relying on a technicality, it 
would not be subject to capital gains tax.
5
 By generating a tax-
free gain, this part of the scheme would have ensured that while 
the taxpayer sustained a loss in a technical legal sense, there was 
no loss in a substantive economic sense. The Crown disputed the 20 
effectiveness for tax purposes of the taxpayer’s scheme, and 
invited the House of Lords to view the transactions as producing 
neither a loss nor a gain. The Crown suggested that the court 
should treat the transactions as a fiscal nullity.  
The House of Lords accepted this argument. Lord 25 
Wilberforce considered that it is the court’s task to determine 
the relevant transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax 
consequence.
6
 In doing so, he said, a court is not bound to 
consider individually each separate step in a composite 
transaction that is intended to be carried through as a whole.
7
 30 
Where the relevant transaction for taxation purposes emerges 
from a series or combination of transactions that are intended to 
                                                
4 The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v The Duke of Westminster [1936] 
AC 1 (HL). 
5
 At 301. 
6
 At 323-324. 
7 At 324. 
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operate as such, it is that series or combination as a whole that 
should be considered.
8
 
Applying this approach to the facts of Ramsay, the nature of 
the taxpayer’s scheme was such that once set in motion it would 
proceed through all the stages to completion.
9
 The scheme was 5 
designed to produce, and did produce, a loss and a matching 
gain that cancelled each other out.
10
 Therefore, in determining 
whether the taxpayer was allowed a deduction in relation to the 
loss, the court was not bound to view the loss in isolation from 
the corresponding gain. In the words of Lord Wilberforce, “[t]he 10 
true view, regarding the scheme as a whole, is to find that there 
was neither gain nor loss”.
11
 The House of Lords was 
unanimous in dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal. 
B The Fiscal Nullity Doctrine: A Purposive Approach to 
Statutory Interpretation 15 
The House of Lords in Ramsay emphasised that the finding that 
the taxpayer’s scheme had resulted in neither a loss nor a gain 
did not require the creation of a new doctrine. According to the 
House of Lords, the decision was reached by applying orthodox 
principles of statutory interpretation. Lord Wilberforce stated 20 
that the Crown’s argument that the taxpayer’s scheme should be 
treated as a fiscal nullity introduced no new principle.
12
 Rather, 
the Crown’s argument invoked the power and duty of the courts, 
in relation to new and sophisticated legal devices, to determine 
the nature of those legal devices and to relate them to existing 25 
tax legislation.
13
 
In determining the nature of legal devices and relating them 
to existing tax legislation, the court must take a purposive 
approach. This approach can be inferred from Lord 
Wilberforce’s statement that “[t]he capital gains tax was created 30 
to operate in the real world, not that of make-belief.”
14
 Lord 
                                                
8
 At 324. 
9
 At 328. 
10 At 328. 
11
 At 328. 
12
 At 326. 
13
 At 326. 
14 At 326. 
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Wilberforce appears to be saying that when the United Kingdom 
Parliament passed the Finance Act 1965 in order to impose a 
capital gains tax, Parliament passed the Act to operate in the real 
world by taxing real gains and allowing deductions in respect of 
real losses. Thus, Parliament did not intend that taxpayers would 5 
be able to produce “make-believe” losses that would qualify as 
deductions in order to avoid paying tax on capital gains. That 
would defeat the purpose of the capital gains tax legislation, 
which was to raise taxes from capital gains. On a purposive 
interpretation, such losses were not allowable deductions under 10 
the Finance Act. Lord Wilberforce went on to say that a finding 
that such a loss is not the kind of loss that the legislation is 
dealing with is well within the judicial function.
15
 This 
observation is a further indication that the court’s decision not to 
recognise the loss in question as a real loss was based on a 15 
purposive interpretation of the relevant legislation, and not on 
the creation of a new general anti-avoidance doctrine.
16
 
Despite the court’s reliance in Ramsay on ordinary principles 
of statutory interpretation, the case was widely viewed as 
creating a judge-made general anti-avoidance rule, known as the 20 
doctrine of fiscal nullity.
17
 This misconception was probably 
caused by the approach of the courts in the cases that followed 
Ramsay. The court applied the fiscal nullity doctrine in Furniss 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson.
18
 Lord Brightman’s precise 
formulation of the doctrine in that case suggested that the 25 
doctrine was a judicial rule that went beyond statutory 
interpretation.
19
 
Courts have since reaffirmed that the fiscal nullity doctrine 
is founded on a purposive approach to the interpretation of tax 
legislation. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v McGuckian, 30 
Lord Steyn stated that:
20
 
                                                
15 At 326. 
16
 See Christopher Ohms “Macniven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd: The 
Role In New Zealand Of Fiscal Nullity” (2001) 7 NZJTLP 195 at 204 for the 
same opinion. 
17 Ohms, above n 16, at 196. 
18
 Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson [1984] AC 474 (HL). 
19
 John Prebble and Lisa Tat The Doctrine of Fiscal Nullity through the Cases 
(unpublished, available from the author) at [24.12]. 
20 Inland Revenue Commissioners v McGuckian (1997) 69 TC 1 (HL) at 80. 
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The new Ramsay principle was not invented on a juristic basis 
independent of statute ... The principle was developed as a 
matter of statutory construction. The new development was ... 
founded on a broad purposive interpretation, giving effect to 
the intention of Parliament. The principle enunciated in the 5 
Ramsay case was therefore based on an orthodox form of 
statutory interpretation. 
In the same case, Lord Cooke observed that while the fiscal 
nullity doctrine is commonly seen as being specific to the 
construction of tax legislation, it would be more helpful to 10 
recognise the doctrine as an application to tax legislation of the 
general approach to statutory interpretation whereby weight is 
given to the purpose of the legislation.
21
 
In conclusion, the Ramsay decision did redefine the role of 
the courts in interpreting and applying tax legislation for the 15 
purposes of determining the tax effect of related transactions. 
Before Ramsay it was expected that courts would respect the 
legal form of each transaction entered into and would not have 
regard to the economic substance of transactions,
22
 except where 
a statutory general anti-avoidance provision was invoked by the 20 
revenue authorities. Ramsay introduced a new possibility, which 
is that a court may treat certain transactions as having no effect 
for tax purposes, that is, as a fiscal nullity, where it is 
appropriate to do so in order to give effect to the purpose of the 
tax legislation in question. This new possibility is founded on 25 
and gives appropriate weight to the purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation. In this paper the term “fiscal nullity” 
refers to the concept that a court may treat certain transactions as 
having no effect for tax purposes where it is appropriate to do so 
in order to give effect to the purpose of the relevant taxing 30 
provisions. This explanation is not intended to limit the potential 
scope of the fiscal nullity doctrine and it is recognised that 
courts will further develop and refine the doctrine. 
C Fiscal Nullity in New Zealand 
New Zealand courts have not explicitly acknowledged that fiscal 35 
nullity is part of New Zealand law relating to statutory 
interpretation. A possible explanation is the mischaracterisation 
                                                
21
 At 84. See also Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson 
(Inspector of Taxes) [2004] UKHL 51, [2005] 1 AC 684. 
22 Prebble and Tat, above n 19, at [1.4]. 
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of fiscal nullity as being a judge-made general anti-avoidance 
rule, as explained in section II.B. That is, because the fiscal 
nullity doctrine is viewed as being a judge-made general anti-
avoidance rule, fiscal nullity is seen as having application only 
in jurisdictions that have no statutory general anti-avoidance 5 
provision in the relevant legislation, and so as having no 
application in jurisdictions that do have a statutory general anti-
avoidance provision. Another possibly relevant factor is the 
Duke of Westminster principle, which may not be reconcilable 
with the fiscal nullity doctrine. 10 
Nevertheless, New Zealand courts do apply a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation. When it comes to statutory 
interpretation, tax statutes are no different from any other 
statute.
23
 As the purposive approach to statutory interpretation is 
the generally accepted modern approach,
24
 and is indeed 15 
mandated by s 5 of the Interpretation Act,
25
 it follows that when 
interpreting tax statutes New Zealand courts should take a 
purposive approach. Given that the fiscal nullity doctrine is an 
application of a purposive approach to interpreting tax 
legislation, there is a strong argument for treating fiscal nullity 20 
as part of New Zealand law. 
New Zealand courts have recognised that the generally 
accepted purposive approach to statutory interpretation extends 
to tax legislation, whether the general anti-avoidance provision 
is invoked or not. One example is Hadlee v Commissioner of 25 
Inland Revenue, in which the court considered the proper 
treatment in tax law of an assignment of partnership income.
26
 
Richardson J had no doubt that the assignment of income fell 
within the general anti-avoidance provision, but he was of the 
opinion that it was unnecessary to consider that provision.
27
 He 30 
resolved the case in favour of the Commissioner by taking a 
purposive approach to interpreting the Income Tax Act 1976 as 
a whole. Richardson J’s approach is consistent with treating 
                                                
23
 JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4
th
 ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2009) at 216–217. 
24 Burrows and Carter, above n 23, at 205. 
25
 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
26
 Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517, (1991) 13 
NZTC 8,116 (CA). 
27 At 534. 
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fiscal nullity as part of New Zealand law, as the following 
paragraphs will explain. 
Richardson J found that the assignment was effective in 
equity,
28
 and the Income Tax Act 1976 was silent as to the tax 
effect of an assignment of partnership income. Nonetheless, 5 
Richardson J concluded that under the provisions of the 
legislation the partnership income was derived by the taxpayer 
and taxable in his hands notwithstanding the assignment.
29
  
Richardson J reached this conclusion through an exercise of 
statutory interpretation.  He found that the structure of the 10 
legislation as a whole, and in particular the provision dealing 
with partnership income, put the liability for income tax in 
respect of partnership income on the partner and made it 
impossible for the partner to shift that liability by an assignment 
of a fractional part of his share in the partnership while still 15 
remaining a partner in respect of that fractional interest.
30
  
Richardson J went on to consider the position of wage and 
salary earners. He found that there was a statutory assumption 
underlying the derivation of income for tax purposes that the 
person whose personal exertion earned the income under the 20 
contract of employment derived that income and would pay the 
tax.
31
 He said that it could not have been contemplated by 
Parliament that individual employees could opt out of the 
application to their salaries and wages of the graduated tax rate 
structure.
32
 These considerations, in Richardson J’s view, 25 
applied equally to the earnings of the self-employed.
33
 He 
regarded it as wrong to impute an intention to Parliament that 
income splitting with its inevitable undermining of the 
graduated rate structure should be available to professional and 
commercial taxpayers although denied to salary and wage 30 
earners.
34
 As a result, the assignment of partnership income was 
of no effect for tax purposes. In giving effect to the purpose of 
                                                
28
 At 529. 
29
 At 534. 
30 At 531. 
31
 At 531. 
32
 At 532. 
33
 At 532-533. 
34 At 533. 
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the legislation by finding that the assignment had no effect for 
tax purposes, Richardson J’s reasoning in Hadlee is consistent 
with a fiscal nullity approach.  
English Authority provides further support for the idea that 
fiscal nullity is part of New Zealand law. As explained in 5 
section II.B, Lord Cooke suggested in McGuckian that fiscal 
nullity should be recognised as merely an application to taxing 
Acts of a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.
35
 Lord 
Cooke went on to say that “this approach to the interpretation of 
taxing Acts does not depend on general anti-avoidance 10 
provisions such as are found in Australasia. Rather, it is 
antecedent to or collateral with them.”
36
 It is apparent that Lord 
Cooke thought that fiscal nullity would apply in jurisdictions 
that have statutory general anti-avoidance provisions, such as 
New Zealand. 15 
Some Privy Council judgments have taken it for granted that 
fiscal nullity is part of New Zealand law. In Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Auckland Harbour Board Lord Hoffman said 
that some of the work that general anti-avoidance provisions 
used to do has been taken over by the more realistic approach to 20 
the construction of taxing Acts exemplified by Ramsay.
37
 This 
statement indicates that the more realistic approach to the 
construction of taxing Acts exemplified by Ramsay is part of 
New Zealand law, despite the existence of the general anti-
avoidance provision in the Income Tax Act. 25 
The Privy Council again advanced this proposition in 
Peterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, stating that the 
Commissioner was probably entitled to look beyond the form of 
a transaction to its economic substance even without the general 
anti-avoidance provision.
38
 To look behind the form of a 30 
transaction requires a purposive interpretation of the relevant 
provisions. A literal approach such as that applied by the 
majority in Ben Nevis, as will be explained in section III.C, does 
                                                
35
 McGuckian, above n 20, at 84. 
36
 At 85. 
37
 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Auckland Harbour Board [2001] 
UKPC 1, [2001] 3 NZLR 289 at [11]. 
38
 Peterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2005] UKPC 5, [2006] 3 
NZLR 433 at [51]; See also Nadine Zoë Armstrong “Scheme and Purpose, 
the Longstop, and Other Selected Tax Avoidance Themes in Light of the 
Westpac Decision” (2011) 17 NZJTLP 443 at 462–463. 
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not allow a court to go behind the legal form of a transaction. 
The Privy Council in Peterson must be taken as saying that New 
Zealand courts should take a purposive approach to the 
application of tax legislation even without invoking the general 
anti-avoidance provision. It follows that the reasoning in 5 
Peterson is consistent with treating fiscal nullity as being part of 
New Zealand law. 
Notwithstanding the consistency of fiscal nullity with the 
foregoing New Zealand and English case law and the statutory 
authority contained in the Interpretation Act, Australian and 10 
Canadian authorities throw doubt on the idea that fiscal nullity is 
part of New Zealand law. As will be explained in section IV.A, 
the courts in John v FCT and Stubart Investments Ltd v The 
Queen viewed the fiscal nullity doctrine as being a judge-made 
general anti-avoidance rule and as such not compatible with a 15 
statutory general anti-avoidance provision, which covers the 
same area.
39
 
More significantly, fiscal nullity appears not to have found 
favour with New Zealand’s Supreme Court. In Ben Nevis the 
Supreme Court, by a majority, took an approach that is 20 
inconsistent with fiscal nullity. The following sections critically 
analyse the reasoning of the majority in that case. 
III Ben Nevis: Fiscal Nullity Not Treated as Being 
Part of New Zealand Law 
A The Facts of Ben Nevis  25 
Ben Nevis was the first case in which New Zealand’s Supreme 
Court considered the application of the general anti-avoidance 
provision in the Income Tax Act 1994 to a tax avoidance 
arrangement.
40
 The case concerned a tax shelter that benefited 
its participants (the taxpayers) by generating expenses that they 30 
incurred immediately in legal terms, and could therefore deduct 
from their taxable income, but that they would not incur in a 
substantive economic sense for fifty years, if ever.
41
  
                                                
39
 Prebble and Tat, above n 19, at [24.2] and [24.7]; John v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417, 20 ATR 1 (HCA); Stubart 
Investments Ltd v The Queen [1984] 1 SCR 536. 
40 Income Tax Act 1994, s BG 1. 
41
 The majority found that the taxpayers would “probably never incur the real 
expenditure”, Ben Nevis, above n 3, at [127].  
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In order to generate these expenses, the promoters of the tax 
shelter designed the scheme to exploit provisions of the Income 
Tax Act 1994 relating to allowances for depreciation of 
intangible property. The taxpayers also claimed a deduction in 
relation to an insurance premium. For the purposes of this paper 5 
it is sufficient to focus on the deduction claimed in relation to 
depreciation allowances. 
The provisions in question were the definitions of 
“depreciable property” and “depreciable intangible property” in 
section OB 1, in conjunction with Schedule 17, which listed 10 
types of depreciable intangible property.  
Section OB 1 excluded intangible property from the 
definition of depreciable property unless it was depreciable 
intangible property. Section OB 1 stated: 
 “Depreciable property”, in relation to any taxpayer, — 15 
(a) Means any property of that taxpayer which might reasonably 
be expected in normal circumstances to decline in value while 
used or available for use by persons — 
(i) In deriving gross income; or 
(ii) In carrying on a business for the purpose of deriving 20 
gross income; but 
(b) Does not include 
… 
(iv) Intangible property other than depreciable 
intangible property 25 
“Depreciable intangible property” means intangible property of a type 
listed in Schedule 17, which Schedule describes intangible property 
that has — 
(a) A finite useful life that can be estimated with a reasonable 
degree of certainty on the date of its creation or acquisition; 30 
and 
(b) If made depreciable, a low risk of being used in tax avoidance 
schemes. 
Schedule 17 listed the following types of depreciable intangible 
property: 35 
1. The right to use a copyright.  
2. The right to use a design or model, plan, secret formula 
or process, or other like property right.  
3. A patent or the right to use a patent.  
4. The right to use land.  40 
5. The right to use plant or machinery.  
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6. The copyright in software, the right to use the copyright 
in software, or the right to use software.  
7. The right to use a trademark. 
Section EG 1 of the Income Tax Act 1994 permitted taxpayers 
in calculating their income for tax purposes to deduct an 5 
allowance to reflect depreciation of capital assets employed in 
earning income. This paper refers to the provisions relating to 
depreciation that the taxpayers were seeking to exploit, 
including the relevant definitions, as the “fixed-life depreciation 
provisions”. 10 
In order to exploit the fixed-life depreciation provisions, the 
promoters needed to create an asset for the taxpayers to buy that 
they would be able to depreciate. The longer the asset lasted, 
and the more expensive it was, the more depreciation 
allowances there would be available for the taxpayers to deduct 15 
from their taxable income. Because the scheme required an asset 
that would last for a long time, the promoters bought land. The 
scheme involved planting and harvesting Douglas Fir, the 
promoters choosing Douglas Fir because it takes fifty years to 
mature. 20 
Ordinarily, if a person needs land for fifty years, he or she 
will buy it or lease it. Those transactions, however, would not 
have achieved the result that the taxpayers wanted because they 
would not have yielded depreciable property since land is not 
depreciable. The promoters needed to find a way of converting 25 
land into an intangible asset. Not only did the asset need to be 
intangible, but it also needed to have a finite useful life in order 
to qualify as depreciable intangible property under s OB 1. 
The promoters created a licence to use land, the cost of 
which was depreciable if the licence had a finite useful life. The 30 
more the licence cost, the more the taxpayers would be able to 
claim as depreciation. Accordingly, it made sense purely from a 
tax perspective to overvalue the licence so that the taxpayers 
could depreciate large sums. The promoters set the premium 
payable for the licence at a very high figure, which was more 35 
than the value of the land, and the taxpayers bought the licence 
on credit. 
Under the Income Tax Act 1994, in order for property to 
qualify as depreciable, it was necessary that a person had not 
only bought the property but had incurred the cost of it. This is 40 
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because, under section EG 2 of the Act, the formula for 
calculating depreciation deductions included “the cost of the 
property to the taxpayer”, meaning that the cost of the property 
must have been incurred in order for a taxpayer to claim a 
depreciation deduction for the property. People who buy 5 
property on credit on commercial terms are treated as incurring 
“the cost of the property” and, at least as far as this requirement 
is concerned, qualify to claim allowances for depreciation.  
It follows that the purchase of the licence on credit might 
have been sufficient for the taxpayers’ purposes because they 10 
had incurred the cost. However, to make certain that the licence 
would be depreciable, the taxpayers paid for the licence, the 
payment being called a licence premium, by a promissory note. 
In using a promissory note to pay for the premium, the taxpayers 
seem to have been relying on Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 15 
Glen Eden Metal Spinners Ltd in which the court stated that 
“[a]n expenditure is incurred in an income year although there 
has been no actual disbursement if in that year the taxpayer is 
definitively committed to that expenditure.”
42
 
The sum involved was grossly inflated. The promoters were 20 
able to grant a long and inflated amount of credit because (a) 
they had bought the land much cheaper than the amount of the 
licence premium and (b) they had charged the taxpayers certain 
other amounts, some of which were actually paid by the 
investors and which equated to the cost of the land. The 25 
promoters had need of real cash to enable them to pay for the 
land and to plant and maintain the trees. 
B An Overview of the Case 
The taxpayers claimed that the fixed-life depreciation 
provisions permitted the deductions. The Commissioner of 30 
Inland Revenue claimed that the taxpayers’ use of the provisions 
in relation to the claimed deductions amounted to tax avoidance 
and that the general anti-avoidance provision applied.  
In applying the general anti-avoidance provision, it is 
necessary for the court to take a two-step approach, as the 35 
majority recognised in their judgment.
43
 The first step is to 
                                                
42
 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Glen Eden Metal Spinners Ltd (1990) 
12 NZTC 7,270 (CA) at 7,271. 
43 At [107]. 
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determine whether the arrangement at issue satisfies the taxing 
provisions that the taxpayer relies upon as providing a tax 
benefit. Thus, in Ben Nevis the court’s first step was to decide 
whether the fixed-life depreciation provisions relied upon by the 
taxpayers allowed the claimed deductions.  5 
The second step, if the taxing provisions are satisfied, is to 
determine whether the arrangement at issue is a tax avoidance 
arrangement to which the general anti-avoidance provision 
applies. In the context of Ben Nevis, if the general anti-
avoidance provision applied to the arrangement, then the 10 
deductions claimed by the taxpayers would be disallowed 
despite the taxpayers having complied with the fixed-life 
depreciation provisions. 
In relation to the second step of the inquiry, the court was 
unanimous in finding that the general anti-avoidance provision 15 
applied, and the deductions were accordingly disallowed. Where 
the majority and the minority (Elias CJ and Anderson J) 
disagreed was in their approach to the first step of the inquiry, 
when considering whether the arrangement at issue satisfied the 
fixed-life depreciation provisions. At this stage, the minority 20 
adopted an approach that is consistent with the fiscal nullity 
doctrine. 
The minority argued that all provisions of the Income Tax 
Act 1994 should be purposively and contextually interpreted, 
with the result that recourse to the general anti-avoidance 25 
provision is not necessary to prevent uses of taxing provisions 
that fall outside their intended scope.
44
 The minority recognised 
that on this view, since the decision in Ramsay, there are no 
stark differences between the approach to the interpretation of 
tax legislation in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom.
45
 In 30 
other words, they viewed the approach taken by the House of 
Lords in Ramsay as being equally applicable in the New 
Zealand context. Applying this approach to the case before 
them, the minority doubted that the fixed-life depreciation 
provisions, purposively construed, allowed the deductions 35 
claimed by the taxpayers.
46
 
                                                
44
 At [2]. 
45
 At [2]. 
46 At [6]. 
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The majority, on the other hand, effectively took a literal 
approach to interpreting and applying the fixed-life depreciation 
provisions, as the following section will explain. On this 
approach, the majority found that the provisions allowed the 
deductions claimed by the taxpayers, and that only by applying 5 
the general anti-avoidance provision could the court disallow the 
deductions. This approach is inconsistent with the fiscal nullity 
doctrine. 
C The Majority’s Approach to Interpreting and Applying 
Taxing Provisions 10 
The fiscal nullity doctrine was not put to the court and the 
majority did not refer to fiscal nullity in their judgment. 
Nevertheless, it is implicit in the majority’s disagreement with 
the minority, who took a fiscal nullity approach, and in the 
majority’s application of a literal rather than a purposive 15 
approach to interpreting taxing provisions, that the majority did 
not consider fiscal nullity to be part of New Zealand law. 
That the majority applied a literal approach is not 
immediately apparent on the face of their judgment. In fact, the 
majority stated the opposite, describing their approach as 20 
purposive.
47
 The majority no doubt bore in mind that the 
Interpretation Act requires a purposive approach and that it 
would be remarkable for a court to state that this statutory 
direction does not apply in the case of tax legislation. In several 
places in their judgment, the majority took care to emphasise 25 
that they were interpreting the fixed-life depreciation provisions 
purposively. For example, the majority stated that before the 
court considers the application of the general anti-avoidance 
provision the taxpayer must first satisfy the court that the 
taxpayer’s use of the taxing provision in question is within its 30 
intended scope.
48
 The words “intended scope” clearly indicate a 
purposive approach. Further, the majority went on to say 
explicitly that the ordinary meaning of the words of a provision 
includes the purpose of the provision.
49
 
                                                
47
 At [2]. 
48
 At [107]. 
49 At [107]. 
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Nevertheless, the so-called purposive approach that the 
majority applied when interpreting the fixed-life depreciation 
provisions is not the same as the purposive approach that the 
minority favoured. While the minority were of the opinion that a 
purposive interpretation of the provisions would not allow the 5 
deductions claimed by the taxpayers,
50
 the majority found that 
the deductions were within the intended scope of the 
provisions.
51
 If the majority and minority both interpreted the 
fixed-life depreciation provisions purposively then how did they 
each come to a different conclusion when applying the 10 
provisions? The difference of opinion is explained by the 
restrictive nature of the majority’s approach to analysing the 
purpose of the provisions in comparison to the minority’s 
approach. 
The minority argued that the facts of a case must be viewed 15 
realistically, and whether or not the court is concerned with the 
economic substance of transactions will depend on the context.
52
 
The majority, on the other hand, stated that at the first stage of 
the inquiry, when considering the application of individual 
taxing provisions, the court is primarily concerned with the legal 20 
structures and obligations that the parties have created.
53
 The 
majority denied that the court could, at this stage of the inquiry, 
conduct an analysis of the economic substance and 
consequences of the arrangement at issue, and emphasised that 
the court must respect that there are different means of 25 
producing the same economic result that have different tax 
consequences.
54
  
That the majority took a narrow view of the facts when 
applying the fixed-life depreciation provisions is emphasised by 
contrasting this view of the facts with the view that the majority 30 
took when applying the general anti-avoidance provision. The 
majority stated that at this second stage of their inquiry, “a 
further question arises based on the taxpayer’s use of the 
                                                
50 At [6]. 
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 See [54] and [107]. 
52
 At [6]. 
53
 At [47]. 
54 At [47]. 
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specific provision viewed in the light of the arrangement as a 
whole.”
55
  
This statement shows that when determining whether the 
fixed-life depreciation provisions allowed the claimed 
deductions, the majority did not consider the arrangement as a 5 
whole. That is, at this stage the majority focused exclusively on 
the relevant transaction, which was the payment of the licence 
fee in exchange for certain legal rights, and did not take into 
account the circumstances surrounding that transaction. For 
example, when deciding whether the licence fee was deductible 10 
the majority did not take into account the fact that the licence 
fee was paid for by a promissory note or the fact that the 
arrangement was never intended to produce any income for the 
taxpayers.
56
 
Thus, when considering whether the fixed-life depreciation 15 
provisions were satisfied the majority directed their attention to 
ascertaining what legal rights were granted to the taxpayers in 
exchange for the licence fee.
57
 On their view, “the deductibility 
of the licence premium [turned] on whether it was to be paid for 
“the right to use land”.”
58
 20 
Not only did the majority take a restrictive approach when 
determining what the relevant facts were for the purposes of 
applying the fixed-life depreciation provisions, the majority also 
took a restrictive approach when determining the meaning of the 
provisions. Similarly to their decision to view the relevant 25 
transaction in isolation from the surrounding circumstances, the 
majority also chose to consider the application of the fixed-life 
depreciation provisions in isolation from the rest of the Income 
Tax Act 1994. Despite observing that the ordinary meaning of 
the provisions included their purpose,
59
 the majority did not, at 30 
the stage of applying the provisions, consider the purpose of the 
provisions in the context of the Act as a whole.  
This approach is apparent from the distinction that the 
majority drew between the “intended scope” or “specific 
                                                
55 At [107] 
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 At [123] and [126]. 
57
 At [48]. 
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59 At [107]. 
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purpose” of provisions on the one hand,
60
 which the majority 
considered when applying the fixed-life depreciation provisions, 
and the “intended scope [of provisions] in the overall scheme of 
the Act”
61
 on the other hand, which the majority considered 
when applying the general anti-avoidance provision. This 5 
distinction shows that at the stage of interpreting and applying 
the fixed-life depreciation provisions the majority did not 
consider the intended scope of the provisions in the overall 
scheme of the Income Tax Act 1994. 
As the minority observed, settled principles of statutory 10 
construction require that if the use of a provision falls outside its 
intended scope in the overall scheme of the Income Tax Act 
then that use is not authorised within the meaning of the 
provision.
62
 Thus, the fact that the majority when interpreting 
the fixed-life depreciation provisions considered their intended 15 
scope in isolation from the rest of the Income Tax Act and not in 
the context of the Act as a whole provides further support for the 
argument that the majority’s approach was not a purposive 
approach.  
Moreover, at no place in their judgment did the majority 20 
address the question of what Parliament’s purpose was in 
enacting the fixed-life depreciation provisions, and whether that 
purpose would be furthered or defeated by a finding that the 
provisions permitted the taxpayers’ claimed deductions.  
Looking at the fixed-life depreciation provisions, why did 25 
Parliament enact those provisions as they appeared in the 
Income Tax Act 1994? Initially, the allowance for deductions in 
respect of depreciation provided for by section EG 1 related to 
tangible assets only. According to the 1998 Tax Compliance 
Report, Parliament amended the Income Tax Act to enable 30 
people to claim depreciation allowances in respect of intangible 
property in order to promote equity between businesses that use 
tangible, and thus depreciable, assets and businesses that use 
intangible assets, which were formerly non-depreciable.
63
 
                                                
60
 At [103] and [107]. 
61 At [106]. 
62
 At [2]. 
63
 Sir Ian McKay, Tony Molloy, John Prebble, John Waugh Tax Compliance: 
A Report to the Treasurer and Minister of Revenue by a Committee of 
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Although Parliament intended to make the tax system fairer 
for businesses that use intangible assets, Parliament must have 
been aware at the same time that many tax avoidance schemes 
involve intangible assets, due to such factors as the ease with 
which intangible assets can be created and transferred and the 5 
difficulty in valuing such assets. Parliament’s concern that 
taxpayers might misuse the provisions relating to depreciable 
intangible property in order to gain unfair tax advantages is 
reflected in the unusual wording of the definition of depreciable 
intangible property in section OB 1. The definition stated that 10 
the types of intangible property listed in Schedule 17 have a low 
risk of being used in tax avoidance schemes if made depreciable. 
Despite this legislative wishful thinking some very aggressive 
tax avoidance schemes involving intangible property have been 
devised and marketed.
64
 15 
Given that Parliament’s purpose in enacting the fixed-life 
depreciation provisions relied upon by the taxpayers in Ben 
Nevis was to make the tax system fairer for businesses using 
intangible property without simultaneously providing 
opportunities for tax avoidance, should a purposive 20 
interpretation of those provisions have permitted the deductions 
claimed in Ben Nevis? The answer is probably no, and so the 
minority found.
65
  
It is worth noting that it is sometimes possible to overvalue 
intangible property without provoking suspicion, which is one of 25 
the attractions of intangible property for people engaging in tax 
avoidance. However, the valuation of the intangible property at 
issue in Ben Nevis immediately raised suspicions because the 
cost of the licence (the intangible property) was many times the 
cost of the land that the licence permitted the taxpayers to use 30 
for their forestry business.
66
 This clear overvaluation raises real 
questions about whether the licence was depreciable intangible 
property within the meaning of the fixed-life depreciation 
provisions, purposively construed.  
In summary, when interpreting and applying the fixed-life 35 
depreciation provisions, the majority did not consider as relevant 
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to this exercise the economic substance or consequences of the 
relevant transaction, the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction, the intended scope of the provisions in the overall 
scheme of the Income Tax Act 1994, Parliament’s purpose in 
enacting the provisions or whether that purpose would be 5 
furthered or defeated by allowing the taxpayers’ claimed 
deductions. The majority limited their inquiry to determining 
whether the legal rights and obligations created by the parties 
satisfied a literal reading of the words of the provisions.  
It is submitted that the majority’s approach as described 10 
above is more like a literal approach than a purposive approach 
to interpretation. In their book, “Statute Law in New Zealand”, 
John Burrows and Ross Carter describe the literal approach as 
entailing an “excessive and destructive adherence to the 
letter”.
67
 They explain that an over-literal approach can thwart 15 
Parliament’s intention, since small insufficiencies in, or 
narrowness of, expression can lead to the evident purpose of the 
legislation not being carried out.
68
 Further, Burrows and Carter 
observe that the literal approach goes hand in hand with a very 
narrow view of context whereby, if the words of the section in 20 
question have a meaning on their own, there is no need to look 
further.
69
 On such an approach, it may not even be necessary to 
read the section in the context of the rest of the Act in which it 
stands.
70
 Burrows and Carter conclude that the literal approach 
can lead to “decisions that [are] out of line with the overall 25 
scheme and purpose of the legislation, and which [are] stricter 
and more literal than any ordinary reader would arrive at.”
71
  
This explanation of the literal approach to interpretation is 
an apt description of the Ben Nevis majority’s analysis and 
interpretation of the fixed-life depreciation provisions as 30 
described in the foregoing paragraphs. For example, the 
majority seemed to interpret the provisions in isolation without 
taking into account the context of the rest of the Income Tax Act 
1994. This approach is the narrow view of context that Burrows 
                                                
67 Burrows and Carter, above n 23, at 197. 
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69
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and Carter describe as going hand in hand with literal 
interpretation.
72
 More notably, the Ben Nevis majority’s 
interpretation of the fixed-life depreciation provisions permitted 
the use of intangible property as part of a tax avoidance scheme 
in contravention of Parliament’s expressed intention that 5 
intangible property should not be used in tax avoidance 
schemes. This result is arguably out of line with “the overall 
scheme and purpose of the legislation”.
73
 So too is the 
majority’s decision that an amount that will not be paid for fifty 
years, if at all, is deductible as depreciation. Such a decision 10 
may well be “stricter and more literal than any ordinary reader 
would arrive at”.
74
 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more literal 
interpretation than the majority’s finding that a payment for the 
right to use land was deductible as depreciation on depreciable 
property merely because one of the relevant provisions listed 15 
“the right to use land” as a type of depreciable intangible 
property.
75
 
As a result of their literal interpretation, the majority 
concluded that the taxpayers’ expenditure satisfied the fixed-life 
depreciation provisions, and that the deductions claimed by the 20 
taxpayers could only be disallowed by the application of the 
general anti-avoidance provision.  Thus, the majority rejected 
the notion that New Zealand courts can deny a taxpayer the 
advantage of a taxing provision on the basis that the provision in 
question, purposively construed, does not apply to the facts 25 
before the court, realistically viewed.
76
 In taking this approach 
the majority appears not to have considered fiscal nullity to be 
part of New Zealand law. 
The most likely explanation for the majority not treating 
fiscal nullity as part of New Zealand law is that the existence of 30 
the general anti-avoidance provision precludes the application of 
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an approach that is consistent with fiscal nullity, as the 
following section explains. 
D The Majority’s Reasoning: The Existence of the General 
Anti-Avoidance Provision Precludes a Fiscal Nullity 
Approach 5 
The majority’s reasoning seems to be that the existence of the 
general anti-avoidance provision precludes the application of an 
approach that is consistent with fiscal nullity. The majority were 
of the opinion that it is necessary to distinguish between the 
purpose of individual taxing provisions and the purpose of the 10 
general anti-avoidance provision. They said that:
77
 
 “We consider Parliament’s overall purpose is best served by 
construing specific tax provisions and the general anti-
avoidance provision so as to give appropriate effect to each. ... 
Each provides a context which assists in determining the 15 
meaning and, in particular, the scope of the other. ... The 
presence in the New Zealand legislation of a general anti-
avoidance provision suggests that our Parliament meant it to be 
the principal vehicle by means of which tax avoidance is 
addressed. ... In short, the purpose of specific provisions must 20 
be distinguished from that of the general anti-avoidance 
provision.” 
These words suggest that, in the majority’s view, there should 
be no overlap between the purpose of the general anti-avoidance 
provision and the purpose of individual taxing provisions. This 25 
approach means that the scope of the general anti-avoidance 
provision will affect the scope of individual taxing provisions. 
If, as the majority state, the general anti-avoidance provision is 
intended to be “the principal vehicle by means of which tax 
avoidance is addressed”,
78
 and if the purpose of taxing 30 
provisions must be distinguished from the purpose of the general 
anti-avoidance provision, it follows that the purpose of taxing 
provisions does not include the purpose of preventing tax 
avoidance.  That is, according to the majority’s reasoning, it is 
unnecessary when interpreting a provision to consider whether 35 
Parliament intended the provision to apply to the particular 
transaction before the court. 
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On this approach, because the court is not concerned at this 
stage with the possible misuse of provisions, it is also 
unnecessary to consider the economic substance or 
consequences of the relevant transaction, or any surrounding 
circumstances that might suggest that a provision is being used 5 
in a way that Parliament did not intend. In other words, the court 
should not apply a broadly purposive approach when 
interpreting taxing provisions. Such an approach implies that 
fiscal nullity is not part of New Zealand law, since fiscal nullity 
is based on a broadly purposive interpretation of tax legislation. 10 
If the court, when applying a provision, is not concerned 
with the economic substance or consequences of the relevant 
transaction, or with whether Parliament intended the provision 
in question to apply to the transaction, the court must only be 
concerned with the legal form of the transaction and with 15 
whether that form satisfies a literal reading of the words of the 
provision. This approach is the literal approach that the majority 
applied to the fixed-life depreciation provisions at issue in Ben 
Nevis, as explained in section III.C. 
Such an approach is necessary to ensure that there is no 20 
overlap between individual taxing provisions and the general 
anti-avoidance provision, and to ensure that the proper emphasis 
is placed on the application of the general anti-avoidance 
provision. The majority viewed Parliament’s “overall purpose” 
as requiring this result.
79
 That is, Parliament’s purpose in 25 
enacting the general anti-avoidance provision makes it necessary 
to interpret taxing provisions literally in order to give 
appropriate effect to the general anti-avoidance provision.
80
  
The foregoing analysis of the majority’s reasoning explains 
why the majority described their literal approach to 30 
interpretation as a purposive one. Although the majority did not 
explain themselves in this way, the effect of the majority’s 
reasoning is that because of the presence of the general anti-
avoidance provision, a purposive interpretation of taxing 
provisions in the context of the Income Tax Act as a whole is a 35 
literal interpretation.  The intention that the majority attributed 
to Parliament, which is that the general anti-avoidance provision 
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should be the primary means of addressing tax avoidance, is 
given effect to by interpreting taxing provisions literally. Taking 
a broadly purposive approach to interpreting taxing provisions 
would make it unnecessary in many cases to invoke the general 
anti-avoidance provision. Such a result would, from the 5 
majority’s point of view, frustrate Parliament’s purpose in 
enacting the general anti-avoidance provision.  For this reason, 
if the majority’s approach is to be preferred to the minority’s 
approach, the fiscal nullity doctrine, which is based on a broad 
purposive interpretation and application of taxing provisions, 10 
cannot be part of New Zealand law. 
The corollary of the majority’s view that the general anti-
avoidance provision should be the primary means of addressing 
tax avoidance is that the general anti-avoidance provision is not 
in the nature of a longstop. The longstop conception of the 15 
general anti-avoidance provision was suggested by Lord 
Hoffman in Auckland Harbour Board.
81
 The longstop concept is 
consistent with a purposive approach to interpreting tax 
legislation and so is consistent with a fiscal nullity approach. 
The following section considers the Ben Nevis majority’s 20 
response to the longstop approach. 
E The Majority’s Response to the Longstop Approach 
The majority appears to have disapproved of Lord Hoffman’s 
characterisation of the general anti-avoidance provision as a 
longstop, stating that this view places significantly less emphasis 25 
on the application of the general anti-avoidance provision than 
did previous decisions.
82
 The majority’s reservations regarding 
the longstop approach further indicate that the majority 
discounted the possibility of treating fiscal nullity as part of 
New Zealand law. 30 
As noted in section III.B, the majority took a two-step 
approach in their judgment. First, they considered the 
application of the fixed-life depreciation provisions relied upon 
by the taxpayers. Secondly, having found that the provisions 
were satisfied, the majority considered whether the general anti-35 
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avoidance provision nonetheless disallowed the taxpayers’ use 
of the fixed-life depreciation provisions, and found that it did.  
Notwithstanding what the majority said, from a logical 
perspective the majority’s two-step approach is consistent with 
the longstop approach. Any difference is a matter of emphasis. 5 
In Auckland Harbour Board, Lord Hoffman, delivering the 
judgment of the Privy Council, stated that some of the work that 
general anti-avoidance provisions used to do has been taken 
over by the more realistic approach to the interpretation of tax 
legislation exemplified by the Ramsay case, but he noted that the 10 
general anti-avoidance provision was useful as a longstop for the 
Commissioner.
83
 Lord Hoffman’s characterisation of the general 
anti-avoidance provision as a longstop envisages that individual 
taxing provisions act as the wicketkeeper.
84
 Thus, in order to 
succeed, a tax avoidance arrangement must first get past the 15 
wicketkeeper, that is, satisfy the taxing provision. If the 
arrangement gets past the wicketkeeper, the arrangement may 
nonetheless be caught by the longstop, that is, be characterised 
as a tax avoidance arrangement and accordingly rendered void 
for tax purposes. This approach would appear to correspond 20 
precisely with the Ben Nevis majority’s two-step approach. 
The majority’s problem with the longstop approach is not 
that a tax avoidance arrangement must drive through both the 
relevant taxing provision and the general anti-avoidance 
provision if the arrangement is to succeed. Rather, the majority 25 
disagreed that the role of the general anti-avoidance provision is 
in the nature of a longstop because this analogy implies that tax 
avoidance generally will be caught by the relevant taxing 
provision, and that consequently the general anti-avoidance 
provision usually will not be needed.
85
 That the majority 30 
disagrees with this conception of the general anti-avoidance 
provision is apparent from the majority’s statement that 
Parliament intended the general anti-avoidance provision to be 
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the primary means of addressing tax avoidance,
86
 as explained 
in section III.D. That is, the majority’s view seems to be that 
taxing provisions as wicketkeepers will not catch many tax 
avoidance arrangements, and that such arrangements will have 
to be caught by the longstop (the general anti-avoidance 5 
provision). Therefore, unless Lord Hoffman in using the 
longstop metaphor had in mind a particularly butterfingered 
wicketkeeper, the Ben Nevis majority’s view of the respective 
roles of individual taxing provisions and the general anti-
avoidance provision is not consistent with the significance that 10 
the longstop approach accords to individual taxing provisions. 
That is, although the two approaches are consistent in that they 
both require the court to consider the same two steps in reaching 
a decision, the emphasis placed on each step differs according to 
whether the court applies the Ben Nevis majority’s approach or 15 
Lord Hoffman’s longstop approach. 
As Nadine Armstrong explains in her article “Scheme and 
Purpose, the Longstop, and Other Selected Tax Avoidance 
Themes in Light of the Westpac Decision”, Lord Hoffman’s 
longstop approach is essentially the same approach as that 20 
preferred by the Ben Nevis minority.
87
 The minority’s approach 
of interpreting taxing provisions purposively is consistent with 
fiscal nullity, as explained in section III.B. Lord Hoffman in 
Auckland Harbour Board similarly endorsed a purposive 
approach to interpreting taxing provisions, referring to the more 25 
realistic approach to taxing acts exemplified by Ramsay.
88
 Lord 
Hoffman thought that by applying this more realistic approach 
courts could treat as ineffective for tax purposes transactions 
that defeat the intention and application of the statute without 
recourse to the general anti-avoidance provision.
89
 The logical 30 
result of such an approach is that the general anti-avoidance 
provision would not be routinely invoked as a matter of 
necessity, which explains why Lord Hoffman described the 
general anti-avoidance provision as a longstop. 
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That the majority did not embrace the longstop concept is 
consistent with the majority’s adoption of a literal approach to 
interpreting the fixed-life depreciation provisions and provides 
further support for the view that the majority did not consider 
fiscal nullity to be part of New Zealand law. 5 
F Problems with the Majority’s Approach 
The majority judgment in Ben Nevis provides clear support for 
the view that the presence of the general anti-avoidance 
provision in the Income Tax Act precludes treating fiscal nullity 
as being part of New Zealand law. This section of the paper 10 
considers whether the majority judgment presents a compelling 
case for that view. 
The majority’s judgment relies on the proposition that 
Parliament intended the general anti-avoidance provision to be 
the primary means of addressing tax avoidance. The majority 15 
did not provide any support for this proposition, merely noting 
that “[t]he presence in the New Zealand legislation of a general 
anti-avoidance provision suggests that our Parliament meant it 
to be the principal vehicle by means of which tax avoidance is 
addressed”.
90
 This proposition is not self evident and given its 20 
use by the majority as a basis for deciding that the generally 
accepted purposive approach to interpretation does not apply to 
taxing provisions this proposition would have benefited from 
some support. 
There is considerable support for the opposite view, which is 25 
that Parliament did not intend the general anti-avoidance 
provision to be the primary means of addressing tax avoidance. 
Parliament has enacted many specific anti-avoidance provisions 
that address tax avoidance by limiting opportunities to exploit 
taxing provisions or legal structures. An example in the Income 30 
Tax Act 1994 was the exclusion in the definition of “depreciable 
property” in section OB 1 of intangible property that did not fall 
within the defined category of “depreciable intangible property”. 
As explained in section III.A, the definition of depreciable 
intangible property limited this category to the types of 35 
intangible property that were listed in Schedule 17, which were 
types of intangible property that had a finite useful life that 
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could be estimated with a reasonable degree of certainty and 
that, if made depreciable, had a low risk of being used in tax 
avoidance schemes. By limiting the types of intangible property 
in respect of which taxpayers could claim depreciation 
allowances, Parliament thereby limited the opportunities for 5 
exploitation of the fixed-life depreciation provisions.  
The Income Tax Act 1994 contained many other specific 
anti-avoidance provisions, as does the Income Tax Act 2007. 
Parliament’s attempts to limit the opportunities for tax 
avoidance by enacting specific anti-avoidance provisions 10 
strongly suggests that parliament did not intend the general anti-
avoidance provision to be the primary means of addressing tax 
avoidance. If Parliament did so intend, it was not necessary to 
go to the trouble of enacting specific anti-avoidance provisions, 
because Parliament could have relied solely upon the general 15 
anti-avoidance provision to prevent the misuse of taxing 
provisions and legal structures by taxpayers. 
Further, there is good reason to believe that Parliament 
intended there to be some overlap between individual taxing 
provisions and the general anti-avoidance provision. It is 20 
therefore not necessary to distinguish the purpose of one from 
the other.  In Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue Lord Templeman, giving the judgment for the 
majority of the Privy Council, in considering the potential for 
overlap between individual taxing provisions and the general 25 
anti-avoidance provision, stated that:
91
 
“[a] likely explanation is that ... in view of the well-known 
difficulties encountered in the formulation and enforcement of 
effective anti-tax avoidance provisions, Parliament thought that 
an overlap might be useful and could not be harmful.” 30 
It must be noted that Lord Templeman’s statement is not 
precisely on point. That case concerned the relationship between 
a specific anti-avoidance provision and the general anti-
avoidance provision. The taxpayer argued that the existence of a 
specific anti-avoidance provision in section 191 of the Income 35 
Tax Act 1976 that was intended to prevent the exploitation of 
that provision meant that Parliament did not intend tax 
avoidance arrangements that exploited section 191 to be 
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addressed by means of the general anti-avoidance provision. 
Nevertheless, Lord Templeman’s answer to this argument, that 
an overlap between individual taxing provisions and the general 
anti-avoidance provision cannot be harmful and might be useful, 
is an equally compelling answer to the Ben Nevis majority’s 5 
argument that because the purpose of the general anti-avoidance 
provision is to prevent tax avoidance, Parliament cannot have 
intended tax avoidance to be addressed by means of a purposive 
interpretation of taxing provisions. 
If the purpose of individual taxing provisions and the 10 
purpose of the general anti-avoidance provision do overlap, then 
the role of the general anti-avoidance provision must be 
something other than being the primary means of addressing tax 
avoidance. The other possibility is that Parliament intended the 
general anti-avoidance provision to act as a longstop, which was 15 
the suggestion of Lord Hoffman in Auckland Harbour Board,
92
 
as explained in section III.E. The idea that the general anti-
avoidance provision was enacted as a backup, to counter tax 
avoidance arrangements that cannot be dealt with by a purposive 
interpretation of taxing provisions, is supported by the Ben 20 
Nevis majority’s own explanation of the legislative concern that 
led to the enactment of the general anti-avoidance provision. 
They said that Parliament’s concern was that “however carefully 
the general [anti-avoidance] provision might be drafted, the 
results of taxpayers’ ingenuity in adapting the forms in which 25 
they did business could not be predicted.”
93
 Parliament’s 
concern as to the ingenuity of taxpayers in engaging in tax 
avoidance explains why Parliament would enact a general anti-
avoidance provision despite the availability of other means of 
addressing tax avoidance, just in case those other means prove 30 
to be insufficient.
94
 
The majority’s view of the primacy of the general anti-
avoidance provision is not shared by Sir Ivor Richardson. 
Writing extra-judicially, Sir Ivor stated of the general anti-
avoidance provision that:
95
 35 
                                                
92
 Auckland Harbour Board, above n 37, at [11].  
93
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94 See also Armstrong, above n 38, at 461 for this view. 
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... it is not the peg on which the whole system should rest. The 
practical answer surely lies in tax design including specific 
avoidance provisions, rate structures and sound, workable and 
timely quantification and dispute resolution processes, which 
substantially reduce the incentives for tax avoidance. Ideally 5 
then, a general anti-avoidance provision will be relatively 
infrequently invoked. 
Accordingly, it was open to the majority to decide that the 
general anti-avoidance provision is not intended to be the 
primary means of addressing tax avoidance. Given that this 10 
proposition is not self-evident and is a key component of the 
majority’s reasoning, some support for the idea might have been 
expected. 
Even if the majority had provided support for their view that 
Parliament intended the general anti-avoidance provision to be 15 
the primary means of addressing tax avoidance, the majority’s 
reasoning in relation to the interpretation of taxing provisions 
would still not be compelling. There is a logical contradiction in 
the majority’s reasoning that the following paragraphs will 
explain. 20 
Having determined that the fixed-life depreciation provisions 
being relied upon by the taxpayers were satisfied, the majority 
then went on to consider whether the general anti-avoidance 
provision applied to the arrangement at issue. At this stage, the 
majority asked whether the steps taken by the taxpayers were 25 
within the purpose and contemplation of Parliament when it 
enacted the fixed-life depreciation provisions.
96
 The majority 
concluded that the use of the provisions was “outside of the 
scope” of the provisions,
97
 and cannot have been within the 
contemplation of Parliament when it enacted them.
98
 The 30 
majority reached this conclusion despite having earlier found 
that the use made of the fixed-life depreciation provisions was 
within their intended scope, as explained in section III.C.  
This curious result highlights the problem with the 
majority’s argument. At the stage of applying the fixed-life 35 
depreciation provisions, and taking what they described as a 
purposive approach, the majority found that the provisions were 
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satisfied. The majority then reached a different conclusion when 
considering the purpose of the provisions in the context of 
applying the general anti-avoidance provision. On the majority’s 
approach, taxing provisions have a different purpose depending 
on whether the general anti-avoidance provision is invoked. This 5 
approach is confusing. A taxpayer’s use of a provision is either 
within its purpose or it is not.  
One possibility is that when Parliament enacted a provision, 
Parliament was not concerned about the potential for the misuse 
of that provision, but simply intended that taxpayers whose 10 
arrangements satisfied the words of the provision on a formal 
legal analysis should enjoy the benefit provided for by the 
provision. If this is the case, then it does not make sense for the 
court to use the general anti-avoidance provision to deny a 
taxpayer the benefit of a taxing provision that is formally 15 
complied with on the basis that Parliament did not intend that 
taxpayers would be able to use the provision in such a way.  
Another possibility is that when Parliament enacted a taxing 
provision, Parliament did not intend that taxpayers would get the 
benefit of that provision through mere formal compliance with 20 
its literal terms. If this is the case, then the provision has not 
been complied with unless it is satisfied in substance. It would 
therefore be unnecessary for the court to apply the general anti-
avoidance provision in order to prevent taxpayers who have not 
substantively complied with a particular taxing provision from 25 
enjoying its benefits. 
In Ben Nevis, the majority, when applying the general anti-
avoidance provision, found that the taxpayers’ use of the fixed-
life depreciation provisions was outside the purpose of those 
provisions. Given that finding it was open to the majority to find 30 
that the arrangement at issue did not satisfy the provisions. That 
is, the majority could have applied a purposive approach when 
interpreting the fixed-life depreciation provisions and found that 
the taxpayers had not incurred expenditure in the sense 
contemplated by the provisions to entitle the taxpayers to 35 
deductions. The majority accordingly could have disallowed the 
claimed deductions without relying on the general anti-
avoidance provision. Such a decision would have been 
consistent with treating fiscal nullity as being part of New 
Zealand law. 40 
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The minority’s reasoning, which was consistent with a fiscal 
nullity approach, was not fully developed but has left open the 
possibility that fiscal nullity may be found to be part of New 
Zealand law in the future. The following section considers 
whether there are other arguments for not treating fiscal nullity 5 
as part of New Zealand law. 
IV Is Fiscal Nullity a Judge-Made General Anti-
Avoidance Rule and Excluded by Statutory General 
Anti-Avoidance Provisions? 
A Australian and Canadian Authority 10 
Courts in Australia and Canada have found that fiscal nullity is 
not part of the law of those jurisdictions, in the cases of John v 
FCT and Stubart Investments.
99
 Sir Ivor Richardson summarised 
these cases as finding that the Australian and Canadian general 
anti-avoidance provisions “covered the field leaving no room for 15 
the implication of any further matter on the same topic.”
100
 That 
is, the courts in these cases viewed the fiscal nullity doctrine as 
being a judge-made general anti-avoidance rule that could not 
arise in a jurisdiction with a statutory general anti-avoidance 
rule, which covers the same area.
101
  20 
Because New Zealand also has a statutory general anti-
avoidance provision, the same argument could be made against 
applying a fiscal nullity approach in New Zealand. It is therefore 
necessary to assess the reasoning in John v FCT and Stubart 
Investments in order to determine whether these cases provide a 25 
sound basis for finding that fiscal nullity is not part of New 
Zealand law. 
B John v FCT: A Mischaracterisation of the Fiscal Nullity 
Doctrine 
In the case of John v FCT the Commissioner of Taxation argued 30 
that the fiscal nullity doctrine was a principle of statutory 
construction and applicable to the case.
102
 The High Court of 
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Australia rejected this argument, finding that it was not 
appropriate to apply fiscal nullity in the construction of the 
provision at issue or in the construction of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act generally.
103
 The court stated that:
104
 
If any such or similar principle is to be applied in relation to 5 
the Act, it is one that must be capable of implication consonant 
with the general rules of statutory construction. One such 
general rule, expressed in the maxim expressum facit cessare 
tacitum, is that where there is specific statutory provision on a 
topic there is no room for implication of any further matter on 10 
that same topic. The Act, in [the general anti-avoidance 
provision], makes specific provision on the topic of what may 
be called tax minimization arrangements and thereby excludes 
any implication of a further limitation upon that which a 
taxpayer may or may not do for the purpose of obtaining a 15 
taxation advantage. 
Thus the court found that the fiscal nullity doctrine could not 
apply to tax legislation that contained a general anti-avoidance 
provision, because of the operation of the maxim expressum 
facit cessare tacitum, meaning that where there is a specific 20 
statutory provision on a topic there is no room for implication of 
any further law on the topic.
105
 As John Prebble and Lisa Tat 
explain in their book on fiscal nullity, the court was probably 
not correct in applying this maxim.
106
 A general anti-avoidance 
provision is not a code that replaces an uncodified substantive 25 
area of the law but rather it is a statutory rule that exists 
alongside, and that is supplemented by, a large body of common 
law.
107
 As common law rules can exist alongside statutory 
general anti-avoidance provisions, such provisions do not trigger 
the maxim relied upon by the court in John v FCT.
108
 Further, 30 
fiscal nullity is merely a principle of interpretation and there is 
no imperative to interpret legislation to displace principles of 
interpretation.
109
 Thus, even if general anti-avoidance provisions 
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were to trigger the application of the maxim, this would not oust 
the fiscal nullity doctrine. 
To apply this reasoning in the New Zealand context, New 
Zealand’s general anti-avoidance provision should not be 
interpreted as a code that displaces fiscal nullity. This argument 5 
is particularly applicable in New Zealand since New Zealand’s 
general anti-avoidance provision does not exclude or even 
mention fiscal nullity,
110
 and New Zealand’s Interpretation Act 
provides statutory authority for treating fiscal nullity as part of 
New Zealand law, as explained in section II.C. 10 
In John v FCT, the problem appears to be that the court 
mischaracterised fiscal nullity as being a judge-made general 
anti-avoidance rule that could not apply alongside a statutory 
general anti-avoidance provision. This mischaracterisation is 
apparent from the fact that the court regarded fiscal nullity as 15 
placing a “further limitation upon that which a taxpayer may or 
may not do for the purpose of obtaining a taxation 
advantage.”
111
  
The fiscal nullity doctrine is merely a specific application of 
the principle that statutes should be interpreted purposively. As 20 
such, fiscal nullity can only be described as placing a limitation 
on what a taxpayer may do for the purpose of obtaining a 
taxation advantage in so far as a taxpayer may be prevented by 
the operation of fiscal nullity from doing that which is not 
permitted by the statute, purposively construed. That is, a 25 
taxpayer may only gain a tax advantage in a way that is 
permitted by the applicable legislation, and the fiscal nullity 
doctrine is an interpretation tool that a court uses to determine 
whether the tax advantage is so permitted.  
The court in John v FCT probably did not intend to be taken 30 
as saying that so long as a tax minimization arrangement does 
not fall afoul of the general anti-avoidance provision the 
resulting tax advantage must be permitted even if it is contrary 
to another provision of the Income Tax Assessment Act or to the 
Act as a whole. It follows that in regarding the fiscal nullity 35 
doctrine as placing a further and inappropriate limitation on 
what a taxpayer may do for the purpose of obtaining a tax 
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advantage, the court must have considered that fiscal nullity 
goes beyond statutory interpretation and constitutes a judge-
made general anti-avoidance rule. 
The court’s description of fiscal nullity as a “new principle 
of construction” further demonstrates that the court 5 
mischaracterised the fiscal nullity doctrine.
112
  This description 
shows that the court did not recognise fiscal nullity as being an 
application to tax legislation of the long-established and 
generally accepted purposive approach to interpretation. Rather, 
the court viewed fiscal nullity as being a new principle with 10 
special application to tax legislation that had been created by 
judges to combat tax avoidance.
113
 As explained in section II.B, 
the House of Lords in Ramsay expressly disavowed the idea that 
they were creating any judge-made general anti-avoidance rule 
and emphasised that the finding in that case was the result of 15 
applying orthodox principles of interpretation. This view of 
fiscal nullity was reaffirmed in McGuckian.
114
 
A likely explanation for the court’s mischaracterisation of 
fiscal nullity is that John v FCT was decided in the 1980s when 
fiscal nullity was in its early stages of development.
115
 As 20 
discussed in section II.B, the precision of Lord Brightman’s 
formulation of the fiscal nullity doctrine in Dawson suggested 
that the doctrine was a judge-made rule going beyond statutory 
interpretation.
116
  This explains why the court in John v FCT 
treated the fiscal nullity doctrine as a judge-made general anti-25 
avoidance rule despite Lord Wilberforce’s explanation in 
Ramsay as to the true nature of the principles applied in that 
case. 
The court in John v FCT based the decision that fiscal nullity 
could not apply alongside a statutory general anti-avoidance 30 
provision on a misunderstanding as to the true nature of the 
fiscal nullity doctrine that the case law of the time had created. 
This misunderstanding has since been resolved in favour of the 
original approach from Ramsay, whereby the fiscal nullity 
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doctrine is merely a principle of interpretation. As a result, even 
if the argument in John v FCT against applying fiscal nullity 
was correct at the time that the case was decided, the decision 
does not sit comfortably with the modern understanding of fiscal 
nullity. It follows that the case does not provide much, if any, 5 
support for the proposition that fiscal nullity is not part of New 
Zealand law. 
A similar misunderstanding appears in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Stubart Investments. 
C Stubart Investments: A Further Example of a 10 
Mischaracterisation of Fiscal Nullity 
In Stubart Investments, the Canadian general anti-avoidance 
provision was potentially applicable,
117
 but the Crown chose not 
to invoke the general anti-avoidance provision in the hope that 
the court would instead found the tax liability of the taxpayer 15 
upon the genuine business purpose test.
118
 The Crown argued 
that the principle from Ramsay applied in Canada, and that this 
principle provided that a transaction without a valid business 
purpose is not to be taken into account in the computation of 
liability for tax under the Income Tax Act.
119
 Essentially, the 20 
Crown attempted to establish that a broad business purpose test 
existed in Canadian tax law and relied in part upon the fiscal 
nullity doctrine to support that proposition. 
Estey J, with whom the other members of the court 
concurred, considered United States authority supporting the 25 
existence of a business purpose test, but noted that it was 
important to remember that there was no general anti-avoidance 
provision in the relevant United States legislation
120
. Estey J 
compared the situation in Australia where the legislature had 
chosen to enact a general anti-avoidance provision. According to 30 
Australian authority, where the legislature has provided the 
standards of unacceptable avoidance procedures, the court has 
no authority to legislate new limits.
121
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Turning to consider the United Kingdom fiscal nullity cases, 
Estey J said that there was some evidence that the United 
Kingdom courts were developing a principle approaching the 
United States business purpose test.
122
 Similarly to his 
observation regarding the United States business purpose test, 5 
Estey J stated that it was important to note that the doctrine 
developing in the fiscal nullity cases reflected:
123
 
 ... the role of the court in a regime where the legislature has 
enunciated taxing edicts in a detailed manner but has not super-
imposed thereon a general guideline for the elimination of 10 
mechanisms designed and established only to deflect the plain 
purpose of the taxing provision. 
That is, Estey J drew attention to the lack of a general anti-
avoidance provision in the United Kingdom tax legislation as 
being an important factor in the development of the fiscal nullity 15 
doctrine.  
Estey J’s understanding of fiscal nullity was influenced by 
his reading of Dawson and in particular the judgment of Lord 
Brightman.
124
 As explained in relation to John v FCT in section 
IV.B, Lord Brightman’s precise formulation of the fiscal nullity 20 
principle indeed comes close to being a judge-made general 
anti-avoidance rule rather than an application of orthodox 
principles of interpretation. As a result, when considering 
whether the court should recognise the doctrine of fiscal nullity 
as being part of Canadian law, Estey J assumed that this 25 
principle was the same, or nearly so, as that applied in the 
United States business purpose cases.
125
 According to Estey J, 
such a principle would provide that conduct of a taxpayer that is 
not dictated by a genuine commercial or business purpose and 
that has been designed wholly for the avoidance of tax otherwise 30 
payable under the relevant statute can be set aside as though the 
transaction were a sham.
126
 Estey J understandably rejected the 
proposition that such a principle existed in Canadian law.
127
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Thus, Estey J mischaracterised the fiscal nullity doctrine in 
the same way as did the court in John v FCT, and for the same 
reason. Estey J, relying in part on Lord Brightman’s formulation 
of fiscal nullity in Dawson, saw fiscal nullity as going beyond 
statutory interpretation and he treated it as being a judge-made 5 
equivalent of the Canadian statutory general anti-avoidance 
provision.
128
 For this reason, Stubart Investments no more 
provides a sound basis for rejecting the view that fiscal nullity is 
part of New Zealand law than does John v FCT. 
Moreover, the case actually provides support for treating 10 
fiscal nullity as being part of New Zealand law. What is notable 
about Estey J’s judgment, for the purposes of this paper, is that 
having characterised fiscal nullity as being a judge-made general 
anti-avoidance rule akin to the United States business purpose 
test, Estey J then proposed to resolve the case by taking a 15 
purposive approach to interpreting and applying the relevant 
legislation. He stated that:
129
 
It seems more appropriate to turn to an interpretation test which 
would provide a means of applying the Act so as to affect only 
the conduct of a taxpayer which has the designed effect of 20 
defeating the expressed intention of Parliament. In short, the 
tax statute, by this interpretative technique, is extended to reach 
conduct of the taxpayer which clearly falls within “the object 
and spirit” of the taxing provisions. 
The “interpretative technique” described by Estey J is none 25 
other than the purposive approach that is applicable to the 
interpretation of all legislation, as Estey J acknowledged.
130
 
Notwithstanding his conclusion that fiscal nullity is not part of 
Canadian law, by suggesting that the generally accepted 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation should be applied 30 
to tax legislation, Estey J effectively endorsed an approach that 
is consistent with the fiscal nullity doctrine. 
In this context, it is interesting to compare the approach of 
the majority in Ben Nevis with the interpretation guidelines that 
Estey J provides in Stubart Investments. Speaking of cases in 35 
which the general anti-avoidance provision does not apply or 
has not been invoked, Estey J described the situations in which 
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taxpayers will not be assisted by the formal validity of their 
transactions. One such situation is where the provisions of the 
applicable tax legislation necessarily relate to an identified 
business function.
131
 This approach can be contrasted with the 
Ben Nevis majority’s approach to the application of taxing 5 
provisions where the majority was primarily concerned with the 
legal structures and obligations a taxpayer created, and not with 
the economic substance and consequences of the relevant 
transaction.
132
 On Estey J’s approach, depending on the proper 
interpretation of a provision, it will sometimes be necessary for 10 
the court to consider whether a taxpayer has entered into a 
transaction for a business purpose. This approach is similar to 
that of the Ben Nevis minority, who argued that whether a court 
is concerned primarily with the legal structures and obligations 
created by the parties or with the economic substance of what 15 
they do will depend on the context.
133
  
Another situation identified by Estey J in which formal 
compliance with a taxing provision will be insufficient is when 
“‘the object and spirit’ of the allowance or benefit provision is 
defeated by the procedures blatantly adopted by the taxpayer to 20 
synthesize a loss, delay or other tax saving device”.
134
 In such a 
situation, Estey J explained, the relevant provision may, when 
taken in isolation and read narrowly, be stretched to permit the 
claimed benefit.
135
  However, when the provision is read in the 
context of the whole statute, with the purpose of the provision in 25 
mind, the accounting result that the taxpayer has produced will 
not by itself qualify a taxpayer for the benefit provided for by 
the provision.
136
 As explained in section III.C, the Ben Nevis 
majority took the opposite approach to that suggested by Estey J 
and did, in relation to applying individual taxing provisions, 30 
consider the provisions in isolation from the rest of the Income 
Tax Act 1994 and read the provisions narrowly.  
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Estey J’s judgment in Stubart Investments provides support 
for the approach of the minority in Ben Nevis by taking a 
purposive approach to the interpretation and application of 
taxing provisions despite the existence of a general anti-
avoidance provision. Stubart Investments is inconsistent with the 5 
Ben Nevis majority’s approach, and does not support the 
proposition that fiscal nullity is not part of New Zealand law. 
This paper has so far shown that it was open to the Ben 
Nevis majority to treat the fiscal nullity doctrine as part of New 
Zealand law and that the Canadian and Australian authorities on 10 
the subject do not provide support for the proposition that fiscal 
nullity is not part of New Zealand law. The following section 
will consider whether fiscal nullity is inconsistent with the 
principle from Duke of Westminster and if so whether the 
importance of certainty in commercial cases is a convincing 15 
reason for preferring continued recognition of the Duke of 
Westminster principle over the view that fiscal nullity is part of 
New Zealand law. 
V The Fiscal Nullity Doctrine, Duke of Westminster 
and the Importance of Certainty 20 
In Duke of Westminster, Lord Tomlin articulated the celebrated 
principle that:
137
 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the 
tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it 
otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to 25 
secure this result, then, however unappreciative the 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may 
be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased 
tax. 
In Stubart Investments, Wilson J invoked the Duke of 30 
Westminster principle in support of Estey J’s judgment rejecting 
fiscal nullity. Wilson J said that “Lord Tomlin’s principle is far 
too deeply entrenched in our tax law for the courts to reject it in 
the absence of clear statutory authority.”
138
 Sir Ivor Richardson, 
commenting on fiscal nullity extra-judicially, suggested that this 35 
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should also be the position in New Zealand.
139
  The assumptions 
underlying this argument are that applying fiscal nullity would 
be a rejection of the Duke of Westminster principle and that 
there is no clear statutory authority to justify such a rejection. 
The legislature has in fact placed a significant limit on the 5 
operation of the Duke of Westminster principle in New Zealand 
by enacting the general anti-avoidance provision. By applying 
the general anti-avoidance provision a court can, in direct 
contravention of the Duke of Westminster principle, compel a 
taxpayer to pay an increased tax even though the taxpayer has 10 
succeeded in arranging his or her affairs in a way that attracts 
less tax. The application of the general anti-avoidance provision 
is thus a situation where there is clear statutory authority that 
justifies rejecting the Duke of Westminster principle. If there is 
no such justification in respect of the fiscal nullity doctrine and 15 
if the fiscal nullity doctrine is inconsistent with the Duke of 
Westminster principle then arguably the Duke of Westminster 
principle should be preferred to the fiscal nullity doctrine. 
Sir Ivor noted further that there is a particular need in 
commercial cases for certainty. In his view:
140
 20 
Commercial [people] are entitled to order their affairs to 
achieve the legal and lawful results which they intend. ... It is 
what they choose to do that counts and their rights and 
obligations should be determined on that basis except where 
the legislation has itself directed otherwise.  25 
The argument can therefore be made that, subject to the 
application of the general anti-avoidance provision, the Duke of 
Westminster principle is a fundamental principle of New 
Zealand tax law and that continued recognition of the principle 
is justified by policy considerations, specifically the need for 30 
certainty in commercial life. This argument raises two questions. 
First, is fiscal nullity inconsistent with the Duke of Westminster 
principle? Secondly, if so should this inconsistency be resolved 
in favour of the Duke of Westminster principle? 
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The question whether the fiscal nullity doctrine is 
inconsistent with the Duke of Westminster principle was 
answered by Lord Wilberforce in Ramsay. He made it clear that 
his approach to resolving the case did not require the rejection of 
Lord Tomlin’s principle but merely required recognition of its 5 
limitations. In relation to the Duke of Westminster principle he 
stated that:
141
 
This is a cardinal principle but it must not be overstated or 
over-extended. While obliging the court to accept documents 
or transactions, found to be genuine, as such, it does not 10 
compel the court to look at a document or a transaction in 
blinkers, isolated from any context to which it properly 
belongs. If it can be seen that a document or transaction was 
intended to have effect as part of a nexus or series of 
transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider transaction intended 15 
as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being 
so regarded; to do so is not to prefer form to substance, or 
substance to form. It is the task of the court to ascertain the 
legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to attach a 
tax or a tax consequence and if that emerges from a series or 20 
combination of transactions, intended to operate as such, it is 
that series or combination which may be regarded. 
Thus, Lord Wilberforce respected the importance of the Duke of 
Westminster principle and did not think that it should be 
disregarded. Nor did he think, however, that the principle should 25 
be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the court from 
fulfilling its duty. That duty is to determine the nature in law of 
a transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax consequence 
and to relate the transaction to the relevant legislation.
142
 To do 
so the court must establish the facts and make a legal analysis.
143
 30 
Nothing that was said in Duke of Westminster and no perceived 
right of a taxpayer to have certainty when entering into a 
transaction prevents the court from engaging in this exercise. 
Lord Wilberforce further noted that “legislation cannot be 
required or even be desirable to enable the court to arrive at a 35 
conclusion which corresponds with the parties’ own 
intentions.”
144
 Thus, it is not for taxpayers to usurp the duty of 
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the court to determine the proper treatment of a transaction in 
tax law by deciding for themselves what the tax consequences of 
a particular transaction should be. 
In other words, in accordance with Duke of Westminster 
taxpayers have the right to arrange their affairs in a way that 5 
attracts less tax. Taxpayers do not have the right to dictate to the 
court what amount of tax is payable based on the way in which 
the taxpayers have chosen to arrange their affairs. The fact that 
taxpayers have arranged their affairs in a way that was intended 
to have particular tax consequences does not require the court to 10 
interpret the relevant legislation in a way that accords with those 
intention. 
If the court finds against the taxpayer, this is because the 
taxpayer has failed to arrange his or her affairs in a way that 
attracts less tax. In such a case, the Duke of Westminster 15 
principle has no application. If the court, taking a purposive 
approach to applying the relevant legislation, finds that the 
proper tax treatment of an arrangement accords with the 
taxpayer’s intention in entering into the arrangement, then the 
taxpayer will have succeeded in arranging his or her affairs in a 20 
way that attracts less tax. In accordance with the Duke of 
Westminster principle, the court cannot then compel the 
taxpayer to pay more tax merely because the court disapproves 
of the tax saving. 
This view of the relationship between the Duke of 25 
Westminster principle and the fiscal nullity doctrine accords 
with the views expressed in the cases following Ramsay. In 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Burmah Oil Co Ltd, Lord 
Diplock reaffirmed that applying fiscal nullity does not 
necessitate the over-ruling of Duke of Westminster or any other 30 
earlier cases.
145
 He pointed out that Lord Tomlin's principle 
provides little or no guidance as to what methods of ordering 
one's affairs will be recognised by the courts as effective to 
lessen the tax that attaches under the appropriate legislation.
146
 
This observation supports the argument that a taxpayer may not 35 
rely on Duke of Westminster to prevent a court from taking a 
fiscal nullity approach when considering whether the taxpayer 
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has in fact succeeded in arranging his or her affairs in a way that 
attracts less tax. Lord Diplock’s observation was quoted with 
approval in Dawson and in McGuckian.
147
  
A New Zealand case that illustrates the proper relationship 
between the Duke of Westminster principle and the fiscal nullity 5 
doctrine is Hadlee, discussed in section II.C. There is no 
mention in the case of either fiscal nullity or Duke of 
Westminster. Nevertheless, Richardson J in his judgment 
respected the taxpayer’s right to choose how to arrange his 
affairs while still exercising the court’s prerogative to determine 10 
the correct tax treatment of the transaction that the taxpayer had 
chosen to enter into. 
As explained in section II.C, Hadlee concerned the proper 
treatment in tax law of an assignment of partnership income.  
Richardson J drew a distinction between the effect of the 15 
assignment in equity and the effect of the assignment for tax 
purposes. Considering the effect in equity, Richardson J found 
that the assignment by the taxpayer was a binding equitable 
assignment and that the taxpayer never beneficially owned the 
income referable to the assigned interest in the partnership.
148
 20 
Thus Richardson J did not deny that the taxpayer was entitled to 
assign his share of the partnership income. Nor did Richardson J 
re-characterise the transaction on the basis of the economic 
consequences of the transaction or because he disapproved of 
the taxpayer’s ingenuity in so arranging his affairs in order to 25 
pay less tax. It follows that Richardson J’s judgment in Hadlee 
is consistent with the Duke of Westminster principle. 
Nevertheless, Richardson J went on to say that the effect of 
the assignment for tax purposes and thus the income tax 
obligations of the taxpayer were to be determined by the income 30 
tax legislation.
149
 Based on a purposive interpretation of the 
Income Tax Act as a whole, Richardson J found that the 
assignment had no effect for tax purposes and that under the 
provisions of the Act the partnership income was derived by the 
taxpayer and taxable in his hands notwithstanding the 35 
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assignment.
150
 This conclusion is consistent with a fiscal nullity 
approach. 
The foregoing analysis shows that Richardson J’s reasoning 
in Hadlee is consistent with both the Duke of Westminster 
principle and the fiscal nullity doctrine. In effect, although 5 
Richardson J did not express himself in this way, he accepted 
that the taxpayer was entitled to arrange his affairs however he 
wished but found that the taxpayer had not succeeded in 
arranging his affairs so that less tax was payable under the 
Income Tax Act.  10 
Given that his judgment in Hadlee appears to reflect the 
operation of the fiscal nullity doctrine in New Zealand, why 
does Sir Ivor argue extra-judicially that fiscal nullity is not part 
of New Zealand law?
151
 This ostensible inconsistency can be 
explained by the same mischaracterisation of fiscal nullity that 15 
led the courts astray in John v FCT and Stubart Investments.
152
 
As did the courts in those cases, Sir Ivor referred to Dawson 
when discussing the fiscal nullity doctrine.
153
 As explained in 
section II.B, the precise formulation of fiscal nullity in Dawson 
was more suggestive of a judicial rule than of a principle of 20 
interpretation. It is likely that Sir Ivor considered that fiscal 
nullity is not part of New Zealand law on the basis of the view 
that fiscal nullity goes further than being a principle of 
interpretation and amounts to a judge-made general anti-
avoidance rule. Thus there is not necessarily any inconsistency 25 
between Sir Ivor’s extra-judicial commentary on fiscal nullity 
and his decision in Hadlee to take an approach that is consistent 
with fiscal nullity as it is properly understood, which is as a 
principle of interpretation. 
A further point that can be made is that even if the fiscal 30 
nullity doctrine is inconsistent with the Duke of Westminster 
principle, such an inconsistency would not be a reason for 
finding that fiscal nullity is not part of New Zealand law. As 
explained at the beginning of this section, judges and 
commentators argue that because Duke of Westminster is a 35 
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longstanding authority and because certainty is particularly 
important in a commercial context the Duke of Westminster 
principle should not be discarded in the absence of clear 
statutory authority.  
There is, however, clear statutory authority supporting the 5 
proposition that fiscal nullity is part of New Zealand law. 
Section 5 of the Interpretation Act mandates a purposive 
interpretation of statutes. Since the fiscal nullity doctrine is 
merely an example of purposive interpretation of tax legislation, 
s 5 of the Interpretation Act is clear statutory authority that the 10 
Duke of Westminster principle must give way to the operation of 
the fiscal nullity doctrine. 
Fiscal nullity should be treated as being part of New Zealand 
law even though fiscal nullity, and indeed the purposive 
approach to interpretation generally, may cause some 15 
uncertainty for people entering into commercial transactions. 
Although certainty is an important rule of law value,
154
 and is 
commonly viewed as being particularly important in the 
commercial context, the importance of certainty does not take 
precedence over the statutory direction in the Interpretation Act 20 
to ascertain the meaning of an enactment from its text and in the 
light of its purpose.
155
 This statutory direction does not contain 
an exception in respect of tax statutes. 
Such a conclusion does not mean that certainty is irrelevant. 
A purposive interpretation may take into account basic values 25 
and principles as well as the social and economic context in 
which a particular provision sits.
156
 Since certainty is an 
important rule of law value and is considered particularly 
important in a commercial context a court may take the 
importance of certainty into account when determining how 30 
Parliament intended a taxing provision to apply. Thus, the 
importance of certainty may be one relevant factor that is 
considered as part of a broad purposive interpretation, rather 
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than being a factor that prevents a court from undertaking a 
purposive analysis at all. 
In conclusion, the argument that the fiscal nullity doctrine is 
inconsistent with Duke of Westminster and produces uncertainty 
is not a convincing basis for arguing that fiscal nullity is not part 5 
of New Zealand law, for two reasons. First, fiscal nullity is 
reconcilable with the Duke of Westminster principle. Secondly, 
if there is an inconsistency between fiscal nullity and Duke of 
Westminster there is clear statutory authority for preferring the 
view that the fiscal nullity doctrine is nonetheless part of New 10 
Zealand law, even if the operation of the doctrine produces 
uncertainty. 
VI Conclusion 
Once it is accepted that the fiscal nullity doctrine is merely an 
example of purposive interpretation of tax legislation it logically 15 
follows that fiscal nullity must be part of New Zealand law. This 
proposition is supported by both statutory and judicial authority. 
Nonetheless, a number of arguments have been put forward 
that throw doubt upon the existence of fiscal nullity in New 
Zealand law. The purpose of this paper is to show that none of 20 
these arguments provide a strong basis for rejecting the view 
that fiscal nullity is part of New Zealand law.  
The strongest argument against recognising the existence of 
fiscal nullity in New Zealand law is that the decision of the 
majority of the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis is inconsistent with 25 
a fiscal nullity approach. However, the minority judgment in 
Ben Nevis put forward an alternative basis for deciding the case, 
which is consistent with a fiscal nullity approach. For the 
reasons outlined in section III.F, it is submitted that the minority 
approach is the better approach and that the majority judgment 30 
should not be relied upon as a basis for arguing that fiscal nullity 
is not part of New Zealand law. 
There are other arguments that a statutory general anti-
avoidance provision excludes the operation of the fiscal nullity 
doctrine, that the fiscal nullity doctrine is inconsistent with the 35 
Duke of Westminster principle and that the doctrine produces 
uncertainty. These arguments are largely based on a 
mischaracterisation of fiscal nullity as being a judge-made 
general anti-avoidance rule and do not undermine the 
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proposition that fiscal nullity is part of New Zealand law. More 
importantly, because fiscal nullity is merely a consequence of 
applying a purposive approach to interpretation to tax 
legislation, the statutory direction in New Zealand’s 
Interpretation Act that enactments are to be interpreted 5 
purposively is an effective answer to any argument against the 
view that the fiscal nullity doctrine is part of New Zealand law. 
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